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Abstract
This reflective article sketches the specificity of migratory flows in sub-Saharan 
Africa, which is essentially intra-regional. While changing dynamically, the dis-
tinctive features include increasing female migration, diversification of migration 
destinations, transformation of labour flows into commercial migration, and emi-
gration of skilled health and other professionals. These migrations take place 
largely within the context of sub-regional economic unions which are dominated 
by the economies of a single country, and movements of persons have been 
directed to a limited number of countries within these unions. Emigration pres-
sure is fuelled by unstable politics, poverty and rapidly growing populations.  
In general, remittances have been rising steeply and are an important source of 
income for many poor countries and serve as lifeline to pay for basic services, 
health care, education of siblings and children and to enhance agricultural pro-
duction. Yet, millennium development goals and other development agendas are 
being compromised by the emigration of scarce skilled manpower. A major chal-
lenge now facing the region is how to retain, attract back and effectively utilise 
the rare skills of nationals living abroad for national development. The paper con-
cludes by stressing the need for rich countries to help poor African countries fos-
ter local development, reduce poverty and create domestic employment in the 
spirit of co-responsibility. 
Introduction
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), intra- and 
inter-country movements continue to 
be a central feature of life of the people. 
Much of this movement takes place in 
diverse political, economic, socio-eth-
nic and ecological settings but remains 
essentially intra-regional (Adepoju, 
2010). Migrants from and within the 
region include temporary cross-border 
workers, unskilled and temporary con-
tract workers, traders, undocumented 
migrants, highly skilled professionals, 
and refugees. Distinctive forms of 
migration characterise the different 
sub-regions: labour migration from 
western and central Africa to other 
locations within the region, as well as 
the developed northern and oil-rich 
countries of the Middle East; refugee 
flows within eastern, and increasingly in 
western, Africa; labour migration from 
eastern and southern African countries 
to South Africa, and cross-border clan-
destine migration of nomads in West 
and East Africa. These configurations 
are however changing dynamically to 
the extent that no country remains 
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unaffected by international migration 
flows with some serving concurrently 
as countries of origin, or transit, or des-
tination for migrants (Adepoju, 2005). 
These countries are also concurrently 
experiencing challenges and opportuni-
ties with respect to the emigration of 
skilled professionals, the diaspora’s links 
with country-of-origin, and migrants’ 
remittances from within and outside 
the region. 
The issues raised in this paper 
relate specifically to sub-Saharan Africa 
– the root causes of emigration dynam-
ics, migration configurations within and 
outside the region, emigration of skilled 
professionals, the Diaspora and remit-
tances. We then focus on the conse-
quences of these dynamics for the 
region, ending with some suggestions 
on how migration’s potential win-win-
win can be attained.
The number of international 
migrants in Africa rose from 9m in 1960 
to 16m in 2000; and Africa “had more 
than double the number of international 
migrants than Latin America and the 
Caribbean since 1980, and about one 
half to one third of the number in Asia”. 
This represents 14 percent and 9 per-
cent, respectively, of the share of 
worldwide international migration. 
Among the sub-regions, Western and 
Eastern Africa have higher numbers of 
international migrants in general and 
increasingly also of female international 
migrants. Females have increased their 
share of international migrants between 
1960 and 2000, overtaking Asia but still 
trailing other regions (Zlotnik, 2003).
Unlike in other world regions, these 
migrations – better described as ‘circu-
lations’ – involving more than 7 million 
economically active persons and an 
unspecified number of undocumented 
migrants (ILO, 2004), are largely intra-
regional. These complex configurations 
are changing dynamically and are 
reflected in increasing female migration, 
diversification of migration destinations, 
transformation of labour flows into 
commercial migration, and emigration 
of skilled health and other profession-
als. These, and trafficking in human 
beings and the changing map of refugee 
flows, are the key migratory configura-
tions.
The specificity of migration 
dynamics in Africa
 A region rooted in migrations, voluntary 
and compelled, intra-regional migration 
configurations are fostered by shared 
culture, language and colonial heritage, 
factors which also blur the distinction 
between internal and international 
migration and circulation, and between 
migration in regular and irregular situa-
tions in the region (Adepoju, 1998). 
The colonial system reinforced the 
foundation of present day stocks, flows 
and patterns of migration in the region. 
The complementary economies of 
neighbouring countries and cultural 
affinity facilitated movements across 
frontiers. Consequently, significant 
migration across long borders without 
distinct landmarks was largely undocu-
mented as frontier workers commute 
daily between home and place of work 
on adjacent sides of national borders 
(Adepoju, 1988). The fluidity of this phe-
nomenon has prompted the discussion 
whether the term ‘circulation’ rather 
than migration would be more appropri-
ate in the African context.
These migrations take place largely 
within the context of economic unions. 
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Regional economic unions are often 
dominated by the economies of a single 
country, and movements of persons 
have been directed to a limited number 
of countries within these unions. Exam-
ples of these are Botswana and South 
Africa in southern Africa, Gabon in cen-
tral Africa, Kenya in eastern Africa, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria in West 
Africa. In reality, the prosperity of many 
of these countries was built by migrant 
labour—cocoa and coffee plantations in 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, mines and 
agriculture in South Africa, forestry and 
oil in Gabon. Resource-rich but labour-
short countries such as Botswana, 
Gabon, and Côte d’Ivoire rely heavily 
on immigrant labour. Thus, for instance, 
28 percent of the population of Cote 
d’Ivoire are foreign born and one quar-
ter of the workers in Gabon are for-
eigners from and outside Africa. An 
estimated two million immigrants 
reside in South Africa. (Adepoju, 2000).
In West Africa, intra-regional 
migration is essentially north-south, and 
the principal countries of emigration 
include Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo and in 
the early 1980s, Ghana. Since the 
beginning of the century, workers from 
Burkina Faso have been attracted to the 
plantation and construction industries in 
Côte d’Ivoire and (during the 1950s and 
1960s) to cocoa farms in Ghana. 
Indeed, by 1975, 17 per cent of 
Burkinabes were living abroad. Con-
tract workers and clandestine migrants 
from south-east Nigeria worked in 
plantations of the then Fernando Po and 
Spanish Guinea (Zachariah and Condé, 
1981). Senegal is a country of both 
immigration and emigration. About half 
of its immigrants came from Guinea and 
Guinea Bissau, including refugees who 
had fled their country for political rea-
sons (Adepoju, 1988).
Until the 1960s, Ghana’s high per 
capita income made the country the 
‘gold coast’ for thousands of immigrants 
from Togo, Nigeria and Burkina Faso. 
Since then, Côte d’Ivoire has replaced it 
as the principal country of immigration 
in the sub-region. Côte d’Ivoire’s 
domestic labour force is small hence 
the country’s first post-independent 
president, ignoring colonial-era bor-
ders, encouraged immigration from 
Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Liberia, 
Senegal and Ghana to do menial jobs in 
the plantations which the local popula-
tion despised. Immigrants constituted 17 
per cent of the total population in 1965, 
22 per cent in 1975, 28 per cent in 1988, 
and 25 per cent in 1993. By 1995, there 
were 4 million immigrants out of a pop-
ulation of 14 million. They were given 
the right to work, vote, marry local 
people and own property (Touré, 
1998). In a dramatic twist, the country 
was riddled with crisis since 2000 and 
remains unstable, economically and 
politically, spurring emigration, refugee 
flows and internal displacements, and 
seriously disrupting economic activi-
ties, especially the production and 
export of cocoa and coffee. 
By the mid-1970s, Nigeria had 
become a country of immigration as the 
oil-led expansion of road and building 
construction, infrastructure, education 
and allied sectors attracted workers, 
both skilled and unskilled, from Ghana, 
Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Niger and 
Chad. These workers entered the 
country through official and unofficial 
routes and, by 1982, numbered about 
2.5 million. Many were expelled in 1983 
and 1985. The deteriorating economic 
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situation in Ghana gave rise to and sus-
tained the exodus of both skilled and 
unskilled persons, both men and 
women. Academics and professionals—
doctors, architects, teachers, engineers 
and pharmacists—frustrated by deteri-
orating research and training facilities, 
readily responded to the demand for 
their skills and were absorbed in 
Nigeria’s hospitals, and government 
parastatals. Ghana and Nigeria have 
thus experienced ‘migration transition’ 
from being receiving to becoming send-
ing countries in recent decades. Today, 
Ghana is also experiencing some return 
migration of skilled professionals.
In eastern Africa, people migrat-
ing between Kenya, Uganda and Tanza-
nia took advantage of a common 
language, cultural affinity and shared 
colonial experience, as well as the 
defunct and recently resuscitated East 
African Economic Community. Migrants 
originated from and worked in the rural 
areas of a unified political and economic 
space. The sisal, tea and coffee planta-
tions in Tanzania, Kenya’s sugar and tea 
estates, and the cotton plantations in 
Uganda all employed locals as well as 
foreign labourers from the hinterlands 
of Rwanda and Burundi, densely popu-
lated and resource-poor. (Both have 
joined the resuscitated East African 
community). Oucho (1995) catego-
rised the countries of the eastern Africa 
sub-region into three groups with 
respect to migration dynamics: major 
emigration countries, namely Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia—all in the 
Horn—as well as Burundi, Rwanda and 
Mozambique; immigration countries 
Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zimba-
bwe; and countries of both emigration 
and immigration which are Uganda and 
Zambia, adding, however, that the net 
migration status of all these countries 
changes over time. This is precisely the 
case of Zimbabwe which became a 
country of emigration in the wake of 
political crisis and the collapse of the 
country’s economy, and of Zambia, fol-
lowing the slump in the copper price in 
the world market. Kenya today is a 
country divided, with 300000 people 
displaced and over 1000 murdered in 
the wake of post-election crisis 
(Ayiemba, 2011).
The major countries of immigra-
tion in central Africa are mineral-rich 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
The plantation and mining sectors in 
Gabon and Equatorial Guinea and the 
palm plantations in Cameroon offered 
employment opportunities to immi-
grant labourers from the Central Afri-
can Republic, Congo and Nigeria, as 
well as traders, domestic and service 
workers from Senegal, Mali, Benin and 
Togo. A rich but small country, Gabon 
relies on contract labour and immigrants 
from other African countries and from 
Europe, who constitute about a quarter 
of the wage earners. In the eighties and 
earlier, thousands of immigrants have 
entered Gabon from Burundi, Rwanda, 
DRC and Congo in search of a better 
life and greater security. As urban 
unemployment soared to 20 per cent, a 
presidential decree was issued in 1991 
to safeguard jobs for nationals and 
‘Gabonise’ the labour force, and in Sep-
tember 1994, the government enacted 
laws requiring foreigners to register and 
pay residence fees, or leave the country 
by mid-February 1995. By the deadline, 
about 55 000 foreign nationals were 
expelled, while 15 000 had legalised 
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their residency (Le Courier, 1997).
In southern Africa, during the 
apartheid-era, labour migrants were 
recruited in droves from neighbouring 
countries, often from particular regions 
and villages to work in designated 
mines and farms. Undocumented 
migrants from Lesotho, Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique worked as seasonal 
labourers on the farms of Mpumalanga, 
Free State and Northern Province 
(Crush and Tshitereke, 2001). What is 
new is perhaps the scale and diversity 
of the origin of present-day immigrants 
who brought their skills, enterprise and 
drive, their astute posture, visibility and 
eagerness to explore prospects in 
Africa’s most buoyant economy. Moti-
vated, adaptable and less scornful of 
menial jobs, immigrants not only do 
jobs most locals loath, they also accept 
lower wages which locals scorn, 
prompting charges by labour unions 
that they depress wage levels (Oucho 
and Crush, 2001).
Changing migratory configurations 
also imply that RSA is concurrently not 
only a recipient but a sender, perhaps 
also a transit country, exporting skilled 
migrants to Europe, North America and 
Australia. The thousands who emi-
grated from the country just before and 
soon after 1994 were mostly skilled 
whites, especially doctors and their 
families, sceptical of the prospects of 
black majority rule and frightened of 
rising crime in the country. The main 
migrant labour configuration was from 
peripheral countries, designed to meet 
South Africa’s apartheid-era labour 
requirements (Adepoju, 2003). 
In recent years, Botswana has 
become a major country of immigra-
tion. A prosperous, politically stable 
country, with a rapid and steady eco-
nomic growth over the past two dec-
ades, it has attracted highly skilled 
professionals, who are in short supply, 
from Ghana, Zambia, Uganda, Zimba-
bwe, Nigeria and Kenya. Most of these 
people work in the private sector and 
at the university, taking advantage of the 
relaxed laws on residence and entry 
introduced in the early 1990s, now 
being replaced by the localization policy 
in favour of indigenes (Campbell, 2003). 
Root causes and patterns of 
migration
In general, the major factors prompting 
emigration are the huge disparities in 
earning potential between poor and 
rich countries. These differences reflect 
prospects for better employment 
opportunities, training and skill devel-
opment, and, of course, higher incomes 
in more favourable socio-economic 
environments. In recent times, migra-
tion has been fuelled globally by access 
to information, declining costs of travel, 
demographic dynamics, labour demand 
and supply dynamics, and the economic 
return to labour in high-income coun-
tries (UN, 2007; OECD, 2005). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, emigration 
pressure is fuelled by unstable politics, 
ethno-religious conflicts, poverty and 
rapidly growing populations. Rapid pop-
ulation and labour force growth have 
combined with persistent economic 
decline, huge external debt, retrench-
ment of public sector workers in 
response to structural adjustment 
measures, and environmental deterio-
ration to shape trends and patterns of 
international migration. 
Consequently, migration is not only 
growing in volume in all major sub-
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regions, most countries do not have a 
single migration configuration but a 
whole range of types at once. Sustained 
past high fertility (the demographic 
momentum) ensures rapid increases in 
persons of working ages. Growing at 
about 2.8 per cent per year, the region 
requires about 7.5 million new jobs 
merely to stabilise the employment sit-
uation. Youth unemployment of 18-50 
percent and increasingly among gradu-
ates ready to do any work, anywhere 
and at any wage, creates the pools of 
potential, destitute and desperate 
migrants, whose numbers are set to 
double within 25 years.
Unlike ‘Asian tigers’, however, SSA 
countries have failed to take advantage 
of the demographic dividend of a virile 
young population for investment, eco-
nomic growth and employment genera-
tion. Sub-Saharan Africa’s unem-
ployment rate of 9.8 per cent in 2006 
was lower than only that of the Middle 
East/North Africa region, and it has the 
highest figure for the working poor. 
Globally, the number of working poor 
at the US$1 level declined between 
2001 and 2006 – but in SSA it increased 
by 14 million while the number of 
US$2-a-day workers reached a record 
high of 26 million in 2006 (ILO, 2007). 
The situation has since worsened as the 
on-going global economic and financial 
crisis bites harder and deeper. It is pre-
cisely the decent work deficit that 
prompts the emigration of youths, 
seeking desperately for a more secure 
alternative and a future, to engage in 
dangerous and uncertain journeys in 
dare-devil ventures to enter Europe in 
irregular and undocumented situations 
(see below). 
In most countries, the public sector 
– the dominant employer – has not 
been able to provide viable employ-
ment opportunities to meet the 
demands of the rapidly-growing labour 
force, thus generating large numbers of 
unemployed youths. Mismanaged econ-
omies and human rights abuses, espe-
cially under military regimes across the 
sub-region, have spurred the exile of 
both skilled and unskilled persons. Con-
flicts and environmental degradation 
further aggravated the pressure for 
migration from poorer to relatively 
prosperous regions, within and, 
increasingly, outside the region. In the 
Sahel in particular desertification and 
cyclical famines have triggered waves of 
environmentally-displaced persons 
across national frontiers within and out-
side the sub-region (Adepoju, 1995).
Stressful economic conditions, 
especially the absence of sustainable 
livelihood opportunities, the perception 
of a bleak future, coupled with widen-
ing disparities in incomes and living 
standards between the North and the 
South, have been compounded by 
political factors, especially poor govern-
ance and human rights abuses, fuelling 
the emigration of young educated per-
sons 
Africa’s political and economic cri-
ses have triggered migratory flows to 
new destinations which have no prior 
historical, political or economic links to 
the countries of emigration. Moreover, 
as the various crises have intensified, 
migratory outflows have increased in 
both size and effect. Broader interna-
tional trends – globalisation, regional 
integration, network formation, politi-
cal transformation, and the entry of 
multinational corporations in search of 
cheap labour, coupled with domestic 
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political and economic malaise have 
resulted in many countries that were 
once immigrant-receiving metamor-
phosing into migrant-sending countries 
(Adepoju, 2006b). For more than a 
decade now, these traditional labour-
importing countries and attractive des-
tinations for migrants have experienced 
endemic political and economic crises, 
which spur out-migration of their 
nationals, and of migrants.
Irregular migration to Europe
 The introduction of tougher rules 
regarding entry and residence of for-
eigners in Europe for regular migration 
has, since the mid-1990s, inadvertently 
pushed irregular African migrants to use 
complex routes via the Maghreb as a 
transit region to enter Europe clandes-
tinely. African migrants have increas-
ingly adopted more sophisticated, 
daring, and evasive methods to enter 
northern countries, even as border 
controls are tightened. The Maghreb 
countries, apart from serving as a 
source of migrants to the European 
Union countries (especially Spain, 
France, the Netherlands and Belgium) 
and the Gulf states, have also become 
migrant transit and destination coun-
tries (Adepoju, 2006a). Indeed, the 
increasing migration through, and pres-
sure on, transit countries of the Magh-
reb by irregular migrants from Africa in 
the hope of crossing to Europe via the 
Spanish Canary Islands and the Italian 
island of Lampedusa, is one of the dra-
matic migration configurations over the 
last ten years (GCIM, 2005b). The num-
bers and, especially, the desperation of 
these youths is fuelled by distorted 
information on labour market condi-
tions in EU countries and the increasing 
professionalism of traffickers, scams 
and bogus travel intermediaries with 
promises of passage to Europe, encour-
aged by the regularisation of the status 
of irregular immigrants in Spain, among 
others. 
Many die in rickety boats on the 
sea, or of dehydration along the desert 
routes. About 2 000 Africans are 
believed to drown in the Mediterranean 
each year while attempting such cross-
ings to Europe. The death of six irregu-
lar migrants attempting to scale the 
wire fence in Ceuta to enter Spain in 
September 2005 prompted the Spanish 
government to double the height of this 
metal barricade and defend it with 
Spanish Legion soldiers and the Civil 
Guard. The government also stepped 
up its anti-immigrant collaboration with 
Moroccan security forces. Since the 
mid-1990s, intensified border patrol-
ling at the Straits of Gibraltar has 
prompted migrants to cross from 
places further east on the Mediterra-
nean coast, as well as exploring new 
crossing points from ports in Senegal 
and Mauritania (Adepoju, 2006). For 
these young men and women, creating 
more productive jobs and decent work 
locally holds the promise to arresting 
the irregular migration of an increasing 
number of persons surreptitiously seek-
ing entry to Europe. 
Demand and supply of unskilled 
and skilled workers
Rich countries need immigrants to cope 
with prevailing economic and demo-
graphic imperatives: unskilled, some-
times undocumented, immigrants to do 
poorly paid, dirty, and dangerous jobs 
which nationals scorn; and highly skilled 
professionals – IT specialists, engineers, 
doctors and nurses – are in short sup-
ply. In many poor African countries, the 
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best and brightest are migrating abroad, 
sometimes working in menial jobs – a 
loss of productivity to both sending and 
receiving countries and indeed the 
migrants whose skills are underutilized. 
This situation persists as globalisation, 
which facilitates movement of capital, 
information and technology, frowns on 
labour mobility.
Unskilled migrants are required for 
some kinds of economic activities and
are vital to the thriving local economy. 
Without unskilled migrant workers to 
do the unglamorous jobs, which indi-
genes are increasingly reluctant to take 
up, some services in rich countries 
could not function. In virtually all devel-
oped regions, undocumented immi-
grants are exploited and vulnerable, 
compelled to accept jobs with unpleas-
ant physical demands, low and irregular 
wages, and long working hours. The 
irregular situation of migrants can and 
do mitigate the potential advantages of 
migration. Most irregular migrants 
work in the underground economy 
characterised by unstable jobs and low 
pay. Pegged to the 3Ds – dirty, demean-
ing and dangerous jobs – they are vul-
nerable, exploited, cannot unionise, and 
unscrupulous employers often refuse to 
pay, threatening them with deportation 
if brought to the attention of immigra-
tion officials. A growing number of 
migrants are in vulnerable situations, 
mainly because of their irregular status 
or the kind of work they do, and many 
face discrimination. Most irregular 
migrants are deskilled, frustrated and 
have poor access to training opportuni-
ties, advancement and job carrier. Many 
African graduate engineers in EU coun-
tries clean train tracks, wash toilets, or 
drive cabs as a survival strategy to enter 
the restrictive labour market. Many 
spend years to defray the huge cost of 
their irregular migration, and are unable 
to remit money home. Being vulnera-
ble, exploitable and subject to uncer-
tainty and insecurity, when they do 
remit money, they normally opt for 
informal and risky channel of remit-
tances for fear of apprehension and 
deportation.
The greying of populations and 
labour shortages in rich countries may 
accelerate the demand for labour in 
many sectors. In SSA, high population 
growth accentuates the supply of man-
power, creating a pool of potential emi-
grants, with a mix of skills, ready to fill 
vacancies created by an ageing popula-
tion in the North. The interplay, by pro-
moting migration between these 
regions, transcends narrow demo-
graphic dynamics. Experience has 
shown that strict restriction on legal 
migration leads to illegal movements. 
Closed borders with zero immigration, 
and open borders for unrestricted 
immigration are both unrealistic aims, 
prompting some EU countries to pro-
pose a strategy of conditional opening 
of borders to admit immigrants who 
satisfy specified criteria, to cope with 
prevailing economic and demographic 
imperatives. What seems obvious is 
that additional workers are required to 
make up for the expected shortfall in 
domestic labour force of rich countries 
and bolster economic growth (GCIM, 
2005). This statistical reality is however 
clouded by xenophobic public opinion. 
Partial solutions include training local 
unskilled and unemployed persons, and 
attracting women to the labour market. 
Rich countries nevertheless need immi-
grants to do poorly paid, dirty, and dan-
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gerous jobs which nationals scorn. They 
also need highly specialised profession-
als, especially software specialists, engi-
neers, doctors and nurses, all of whom 
are in short supply.
Brain drain
At independence, African countries 
invested heavily in education to train 
nationals to fill the gap created by the 
departing colonialists, education being 
regarded as the main vehicle for rapid 
development. Within a generation, 
these poor countries were able to pro-
duce professionals and recently IT spe-
cialists. Others were trained abroad, 
building on the foundation of science 
and maths courses, even as these coun-
tries were trapped in the immense 
demographic momentum in a situation 
of sluggish economic growth and 
employment generation. However, 
education expanded faster than the 
absorptive capacity of these countries’ 
economies. The small private and 
bloated public sectors absorbed only 
few graduates, resulting in graduate 
unemployment. Many students spon-
sored to do post graduate studies in 
technology, science and engineering 
abroad stayed back at the end of their 
studies. Emigration of highly qualified 
professionals from Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Senegal, Ghana and Uganda to South 
Africa and outside Africa in the 70s 
intensified in the 80s to Europe, North 
America and the oil-rich Middle East; 
between 1986 and 1990, for example, 
an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 middle 
and high-level African managers emi-
grated as domestic socio-economic and 
political conditions deteriorated (Ade-
poju, 2000). Many more are believed to 
have emigrated in recent years.
The global migration market allows 
developed countries to unilaterally and 
freely select who should be admitted, 
what skill combination and income pro-
file, when and for how long without 
recourse to the countries of origin that 
incurred the human capital investment 
in the migrants. The battle for brains, or 
talent hunt, is propelled by the dynam-
ics of knowledge-based economies: the 
possibilities offered by technology and 
the globalisation of economic activities 
– as many industries now operate with 
an international network of operations, 
components and talents. In many devel-
oped economies, highly qualified labour 
for knowledge-intensive activities is 
being recruited from third world and 
emerging market economy countries 
(Van Agtmael, 2007).
In the Netherlands, for example, 
the government’s ‘inviting policy’ in 
2004 simplified the admission of highly 
qualified professionals, required for 
dynamic knowledge-intensive econ-
omy of the twenty-first century, from 
developing countries using a points sys-
tem based on personal talents, age, 
education and work experience (Neth-
erlands Government, 2006). Germany’s 
migration law, which came into effect in 
2005, creates opportunities for admit-
ting academics and specialists in the 
technology sector by offering them per-
manent residence. Their family mem-
bers can work without restrictions and 
are not subject to integration require-
ments. The basic principle of France’s 
new bill on immigration and integration 
is to secure a more ‘elective’ immigra-
tion for work, study, and research, with 
a focus on migrants with specific talents 
who have the potential to contribute to 
the economic development of France. 
Britain’s points system, adopted in 
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March 2006, for admitting students and 
labour migrants, offers highly-skilled 
migrants a residence permit for a maxi-
mum of five years. It also allows them 
to change jobs without further verifica-
tion. The system permits students to 
look for work for a year in England and 
two years in Scotland at the end of their 
studies (Adepoju, 2007). If you visit a 
health facility, it is quite likely that the 
doctor will be Kenyan, the nurse Gha-
naian, the anaesthetist Zimbabwean, 
the surgeon South African, the therapist 
Nigerian! 
In the United States, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Sciences 
projected a shortfall of about 270,000 
full-time registered nurses by 2010 and 
800,000 by 2020 (Clearfield and Bata-
lova, 2007). Already in 2005, 15 per-
cent of all health care workers were 
foreign born. Sub-Saharan African 
immigrants in the USA are dominated 
by West Africans. Of the 809 152 for-
eign-born SSA population in the USA 
captured by official statistics in 2002, 
357 360 originated from West Africa. 
These include 139 493 Nigerians, with 
South Africans constituting a majority of 
those from southern Africa, at 70 275 
out of 71 883. Most of these immigrants 
have tertiary education, including stu-
dents with doctoral degrees (Lucas, 
2005).
Highly skilled professionals, includ-
ing doctors, paramedical personnel, 
nurses, teachers, engineers, scientists 
and technologists from Africa, were and 
continue to be attracted by relatively 
higher salaries and better living condi-
tions in rich countries. For instance, 
after the collapse of Nigeria’s oil-led 
economy in the mid-1980s, many Gha-
naian professionals who had earlier 
worked in Nigeria moved, in a step-
wise pattern to South Africa, and then 
to Europe and North America, and the 
oil-rich Middle East. Many highly skilled 
people have emigrated to developed 
countries in response to the deteriorat-
ing domestic socio-economic and politi-
cal conditions.
According to OECD estimates, of 
the nearly 4 million foreign-born popu-
lation of sub-Saharan Africa resident in 
OECD countries, the USA (929 723), 
the UK (812 371), France (565 590), 
Portugal (348 263), Canada (271 095) 
and Australia (188 928) are the major 
recipient countries. Others with slightly 
more than 100 000 sub-Sahara Africans 
include the Netherlands (116 349) and 
Belgium (107 716), trailed by Sweden 
(68 077), Spain (79 263) and Greece 
(56 859). More than 100 000 (2½ per 
cent) are professionals (OECD, 2007). 
This is, ironically, about the same as the 
number of expatriate professionals 
employed by aid agencies in sub-Saha-
ran Africa as part of the overall aid 
package – at a cost to the region of 
about $4 billion. This process denies 
the region the optimum utilisation of 
the skills of its diaspora and of develop-
ment goals by the outflow of home-
grown scarce skilled manpower 
(United Nations, 2003). For Nigerians 
and Zambians in particular, highly skilled 
professionals constitute about a half or 
more of expatriates living in OECD 
countries. Two in every five nationals of 
Benin, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Cam-
eroon, Lesotho, Malawi and South 
Africa are highly skilled professionals. 
The driving force is the wide differential 
in incomes: a trained nurse in Uganda 
earns $ US38 per month and a doctor 
$67 per month while their colleagues in 
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the USA could earn about $3 000 and 
$10 000, respectively. The region 
thereby pays the price of producing the 
human capital for use by the rich coun-
tries, and is denied the realisation of its 
development goals.
About 23 000 African university 
graduates and 50 000 executives leave 
the sub-Saharan region annually, and 
about 40 000 of them with Ph D 
degrees now live outside Africa (Mayer, 
2001). It is estimated that people of for-
eign origin represent 12 per cent of the 
highly qualified component of the 
labour force in the USA, and this may 
well also be true of many European 
countries. Africans with professional, 
technical and managerial skills have 
used the US ‘diversity visa’ (or Green 
Card lottery) programme, which was 
designed to liberalise immigration by 
creating avenues for large numbers of 
immigrants from new sources to enter 
the USA. Between 1990 and 1998, 
these numbered 52 000 or 7 per cent 
of the total of professional, technical 
and managerial immigrants to the USA 
(Lucas, 2005). Probably about a third of 
researchers and engineers from poor 
countries work in (developed) OECD 
countries, a significant number indeed 
and a huge human capital flow pro-
duced at great cost by poor countries 
(Adepoju, 2006b).
Specialists in new technologies, 
engineering, medicine and healthcare 
are a small proportion of the emigrants 
from sub-Saharan Africa, but they cost 
the region in a variety of ways and far 
beyond their numbers, not least 
because of the lost opportunity for the 
training of replacement cohorts: terti-
ary educational institutions lack experi-
enced leaders to train those required 
for a variety of development activities 
and to undertake research for develop-
ment. The large exodus of doctors has 
impacted negatively on the training of 
new doctors and on the quality of 
health services delivery in Nigeria (from 
where about 600 medical specialists 
work in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and 
up to 12 000 in the USA), in Ghana 
(where 60 per cent of doctors trained 
in the 1980s have emigrated), South 
Africa (where many white doctors have 
emigrated to Canada, Australia, the 
USA and UK) and Zimbabwe (where 
about 60 per cent of doctors have 
moved to Botswana and South Africa as 
their country’s economy collapsed) 
(Adepoju, 2005). The driving force is 
the wide differential in incomes and 
working conditions.
The overall magnitude and impact 
of the brain drain from sub-Saharan 
Africa is captured in a report by the 
United Nations which estimates that 
“over the next decade Africa will need 
to train an additional 1 million health 
care professionals. The leaders must 
find ways to retain more of the doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists and laboratory 
technicians (which) they currently pro-
duce” (United Nations, 2005:18). Blam-
ing the rich countries for contributing 
to the crisis by creating a fatal ‘flow’ of 
health professions from the region, the 
report points out that there are more 
Malawian doctors practising in Man-
chester, UK, than in Malawi itself, while 
550 of the 600 Zambian doctors trained 
in medical school from 1978 to 1999 
have emigrated abroad (ibid.). The IOM 
reports, similarly, that more Ethiopian 
doctors are practicing in Chicago (USA) 
than in Ethiopia. More than half of 
nurses and doctors have emigrated 
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from Malawi, and another quarter of 
the remaining health workers are prob-
ably infected with HIV/AIDS. If statistics 
are to be trusted, Ghana has lost 50 per 
cent of its doctors to Canada, Britain 
and the USA. Three-quarters of Zimba-
bwe’s doctors left the country since the 
early 1990s and half of social health 
workers have relocated abroad since 
2001. In the last eight years more than 
16 000 nurses and about 12 500 doc-
tors from the region are currently regis-
tered to work in Britain (UKNMC, 
2005). 
Millennium development goals and 
other development agendas in the 
region are being compromised by the 
emigration of its scarce skilled man-
power. A major challenge now facing 
the region is how to retain, attract back 
and effectively utilise the rare skills of 
nationals living mainly in the OECD 
countries for national development. 
Sub-Saharan African transnational com-
munities rarely sever ties with home 
and this is manifested in their invest-
ment portfolios; some are active in 
political advocacy, charity and cultural 
exchange. The series of initiatives to 
identify and attract back skilled profes-
sionals—engineers, medical doctors, 
professors, scientists, information tech-
nologists and other highly skilled pro-
fessionals—and utilise their expertise 
for national development should be 
encouraged and supported by develop-
ment partners and rich countries. Politi-
cal leaders courting nationals to return 
home must also address the push fac-
tors that spurred the brain drain. 
Remittances do not compensate for the 
potential contribution of the skilled 
emigrants through training and transfer 
of expertise to younger cohorts at 
home. 
Migration, especially of skilled pro-
fessionals to engineer development, is a 
global issue, and is of concern to both 
poor and rich countries, albeit from 
opposite perspectives. Rich countries 
have been prompted to rethink and 
consolidate policies on who should be 
attracted and admitted to satisfy their 
skilled labour shortage. For poor coun-
tries – especially in Africa and Asia – the 
loss of specialists in IT, engineering and 
medicine, while a miniscule proportion 
of the workforce, has impacted far 
beyond the numbers involved. This 
migration process denies these poorer 
regions the optimum utilisation of the 
skills of their diaspora. Many African 
countries today are churning out stu-
dents without the requisite rigour of 
learning from older experts in their 
fields, or doing research for develop-
ment and training, thereby stalling 
development activities and accelerating 
the collapse of institutions.
Brain circulation
In SSA, we are now witnessing the 
transformation of brain drain to brain 
circulation within the region, especially 
from parts of Africa to Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gabon, Botswana, and South Africa. As 
political and economic crises continue 
to adversely affect conditions in the tra-
ditional countries of immigration within 
the region, highly skilled professionals, 
pressured to leave their countries by 
the uncertain economic conditions, 
have found a new RSA, and the boom-
ing economy of Botswana, attractive 
alternatives to Europe, North America 
and the Golf States transforming, the 
erstwhile brain drain from, into brain 
circulation within, the region. Migra-
tion to RSA increased further since the 
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demise of the apartheid regime and the 
spectacular political transformation in 
the country. The migrants were mostly 
skilled professionals - professors, doc-
tors, lawyers, nurses and engineers - 
unlike the traditional immigrants from 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi 
and Mozambique, whose nationals 
were mostly unskilled mine workers 
and farm labourers. Most migrants in 
Botswana are highly skilled profession-
als in industry, university and private 
sector (Adepoju, 2003). There are 
about 300,000 unfilled posts in South 
Africa requiring skills which nationals do 
not possess, in a situation of about 40 
percent unemployment rate even as 
white doctors, engineers, nurses and 
other professionals are emigrating to 
Australia, Canada and UK, attracted by 
higher incomes, scared of the rising 
domestic crime, and oblivious of the 
progressive policies of the post-apart-
heid era.
The diaspora
Migrant-diaspora-return continuum and 
linkages are both strong and pervasive 
in Africa. During their sojourn abroad 
migrants maintain contact by visiting 
and sending money home. African 
emigrants usually nurse the hope to 
return home at the nearest opportu-
nity. Many sending countries (Ghana, 
Cape Verde, Nigeria, Burkina Faso) 
have expatriate populations spread 
over all parts of the world, as a result of 
emigration over generations. The 
number of African diaspora is clouded 
by the history of the slave trade, but an 
estimated 30 million Africans are work-
ing outside their countries of origin 
(Ratha, 2011). More recent emigrants, 
wherever they are, rarely sever their 
ties with home (Adepoju, et al. 2006c). 
Given favourable working conditions at 
home, skilled professionals in the 
diaspora would prefer to return there 
to contribute to the development of 
their countries. At the political level, 
the Africa Union has officially recog-
nised the Diaspora as Africa’s sixth 
region (others being western, central, 
northern, southern and eastern Africa).
Building networks of scientists with 
their colleagues at home enables the 
Diaspora professionals to contribute to 
the development of home countries 
without residential relocation, should 
be encouraged but the stiff immigration 
policies of rich countries preclude many 
scientists the flexibility to relocate. But 
the challenges are daunting: many poor 
African countries lack the requisite 
infrastructure, even as poverty, corrup-
tion and mismanagement artificially 
increase the cost of setting up and 
maintaining needed infrastructures. 
African diaspora are active in political 
advocacy, charity and cultural exchange. 
For example, Ghanaian Diaspora in the 
UK have pressed and received conces-
sion from their government to partici-
pate in national elections and are also 
actively involved in modernising politi-
cal process. African diasporic associa-
tions also help new arrivals adapt and 
insert into labour markets, reinforce 
cultural identity, and mobilise members’ 
capital for community development 
projects at ‘home’ and contribute to 
charity and development programmes 
(Adepoju, 2007b). Nigerians in 
Diaspora Organisations (NIDO) have 
been established and are actively 
involved in dialogue with governments 
at home.
Networking amongst professionals 
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in the diaspora and their counterparts 
at home should be encouraged – in 
training, technology transfer, informa-
tion exchange and research projects, 
principally via the Internet. The possibil-
ity for IT specialists in Africa to work 
for international corporations without 
physical dislocation should again be 
encouraged. 
African leaders are now exploring 
strategies to attract back their nationals 
to contribute to national development. 
Leaders of Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, 
among others, have held series of 
meetings with their nationals in 
Diaspora, encouraging them to return 
with offers of incentives to do so. 
About a dozen governments have 
established ministries or agencies of the 
Diaspora to coordinate diaspora-
related programmes. Many migrants 
who also nurse the hope to return 
home ultimately may have acquired 
skills and capital that can be produc-
tively invested back home but we 
should also recognise that the skills 
acquired by some may not match avail-
able job opportunities at home. We 
need more evidence-based research on 
lessons learnt from, for instance, IOM’s 
Return and Reintegration of Qualified 
Nationals and similar programmes in 
Africa to facilitate return, retention and 
reintegration of nationals and to pro-
mote their potential for country-of-ori-
gin development (see IOM, 2001).
Remittances and other diaspora 
resources
Diaspora resources include economic 
remittance, other contributions such as 
social capital (sources of ideas, behav-
iours, identities and social capital), tech-
nological capital (transfer of knowledge 
and skills) and political remittance 
(political support, identities and prac-
tices). In general, migration is a factor of 
economic development that can have 
both positive and negative conse-
quences. Advantages of migration 
include migrants’ remittances, lower 
unemployment, less population pres-
sure and knowledge brought by return-
ing migrants. Immigrants in general 
embody energy, determination and 
enterprise and can dynamise econo-
mies, social organisation and inter-
change of experience. The major 
challenge is how to make migration 
work productively for, and to channel 
movements into, regular situations to 
benefit the three key actors - migrants, 
origin and destination countries, socie-
ties and families. 
In addition to direct financial contri-
butions, migration leads to formation of 
transnational communities that boosts 
economic development. Migrant com-
munities abroad, as well as returning 
migrants, become conduits for new 
ideas and investment. Migrants them-
selves form associations and networks 
abroad. Returning migrants bring back 
skills and work experiences from 
abroad. Emigrants can also transfer 
knowledge, technology and invest-
ments to countries of origin. 
Remittances have been rising 
steeply and now parallel export earn-
ings, official ODA, and in the case of 
Lesotho, accounts for one-half of the 
GNP. Remittances are an important 
source of income for developing coun-
tries. Nationals of Egypt, Burkina Faso, 
Nigeria, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Eritrea, 
and so on working abroad remit huge 
sums of money to their home coun-
tries.
The sheer volume of remittances - 
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over $40 billion a year - has kindled 
optimism about their positive contribu-
tion, and the role of the diaspora, to 
development in home countries. Remit-
tances are expected to be additional 
sources of development financing in 
Africa by providing a lifeline, not only to 
communities and families to enable 
them to gain access to basic services 
such as housing, education and health, 
but also to national savings and invest-
ment via money and capital markets. 
However, the real impact of remit-
tances on the economies of emigration 
countries in Africa is yet to be fully 
understood as, apart from their raising 
the level of national savings, remit-
tances are essentially private transfers 
that do not directly augment the public 
budget. Governments also have no con-
trol over them and do not determine 
their destination or their use. Nor are 
market forces able to channel remit-
tances to the most productive sectors 
or into the most innovative entrepre-
neurial hands to promote development 
(Ratha, 2007).
The use of remittances varies 
widely – as lifeline to poor relations left 
behind to pay for basic services, health 
care in particular; education of siblings 
and children; to set up enterprises; and 
to enhance agricultural production 
through improved irrigation schemes 
and other agricultural inputs, as in Mali 
and Senegal. In Lesotho, remittances 
constitute the lifeline to the survival of 
impoverished rural households. Since 
migration in Africa is generally a house-
hold portfolio diversification strategy, 
pooling resources helps the poor over-
come the poverty constraint to migra-
tion (Boswell and Crisp, 2004). 
Remittances sent to families at home 
could tremendously benefit recipients 
to supplement living conditions, invest-
ment in education of children and sib-
lings, health care, improved housing and 
to set up enterprises with a multiple 
effect on local economies. Hometown 
associations’ investments can improve 
basic infrastructural facilities that bene-
fit all households, with local, often 
wider multiplier effect. 
In poor communities that lack basic 
services normally provided by govern-
ment, the pressing needs are for better 
housing, funds to pay school fees and 
buy textbooks and uniforms, access to 
basic health services – which migrants’ 
remittances supplement or pay for. 
Many migrants harbour the ambition to 
return home ultimately and invest in 
petty trading, refurbished or new build-
ings, real estates which are high yield-
ing, and savings as fallback on return.
Another pertinent issue is that of 
the reliability of remittances. Many fam-
ilies in Africa who depend on remit-
tances from relatives in the United 
States and Europe for day-to-day sup-
port are being affected by the global 
economic meltdown and the crisis-
induced retrenchment and unemploy-
ment in countries of immigration. This 
takes a heavy toll on the daily budget of 
recipients via reduced levels of remit-
tances.
Not all remittances are routed via 
official channels, in view of heavy trans-
action costs and risks. Transaction costs 
of money transfers are exorbitant, and 
may be risky through informal channels. 
Irregular migrants normally opt for 
informal channel of remittances for fear 
of apprehension and deportation 
(Doorn, 2002). Senegalese emigrants 
have adapted the indigenous, trust-
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based traditional human courier system 
(Kara International Exchange) and net-
work of traders, visiting relations and 
associates to send money home. This 
process is prompt, avoids exchange 
rate fluctuations and costly transfer 
charges, and overcomes the bottleneck 
of poor accessibility to remote rural 
areas.
African governments are increas-
ingly interested in promoting migrants’ 
remittances for investment purposes, 
and are using their embassies to dis-
seminate information on available 
investment opportunities to their 
nationals abroad, offering favourable 
(tax and related) incentive-based policy 
environment in the country as in Ghana. 
Kenya’s government has expressed its 
readiness to explore matching funds or 
provide security for bank loans for its 
nationals in the Diaspora willing to 
invest at home. The possibility of 
Diaspora bonds has also been flagged. 
All stakeholders should work in concert 
in exploring the opportunities and mini-
mising the obstacles for remittances, 
and in particular in lobbying for low-
cost transfer services and less stringent 
regulations in order to increase its pro-
ductive use.
Trade and migration
The limited size of internal markets, 
and especially the disadvantageous posi-
tion of sub-Saharan African countries in 
the new era of globalisation, impact on 
migration dynamics in various ways. 
Agricultural subsidies in OECD coun-
tries, especially the USA and Europe, 
have a negative effect on the income of 
farmers in the region. The subsidies on 
cotton in the USA which artificially spur 
the level of local production and 
depressed world prices, impoverishes 
millions of Africans. The US spends 
more subsidising 25,000 cotton farmers 
($4 billion) than it does on its entire aid 
budget for Africa. The immediate 
impact was a loss of $301m by African 
exporters, with Burkina Faso, Mali and 
Benin each losing about 2 percent of 
GDP growth. West and central Africa 
produced 17 per cent of world cotton 
exports in 2002 (up from 4 per cent in 
1980), but heavy subsidies to the small 
number of cotton growers in the USA 
have drastically affected the livelihood 
of 10 million cotton growers and their 
families in Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, Togo, Kenya and Ghana (OECD, 
2004a). Most of these people are now 
migrating to the cities, in a desperate 
bid for survival. Also the World Bank 
estimated that high tariffs and technical 
barriers to trade cost the region about 
$US 20 billion yearly in lost exports—
much-needed revenue which could 
have been used for development and 
employment-generation (IOM, 2004a). 
The clamour by African leaders to 
achieve mutually beneficial trade rela-
tions is understandable: deepening pov-
erty have frustrated recent 
achievements in democratic and eco-
nomic reform and efforts to improve 
living conditions of their people, stimu-
late economic growth and generate 
employment opportunities. 
Cooperation and dialogue for policy 
coherence.
Policy dialogue on migration is at a 
crossroads, not least because of the 
diversity of actors and stakeholders in 
poor and rich countries, and a variety of 
often conflicting interest groups. The 
migration of skilled and unskilled per-
sons is therefore of increasing concern 
to both rich and poor countries, but 
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from different perspectives. In both 
blocks – in poor and in rich countries – 
economic and demographic factors 
underline current debate and policy and 
there is little or no convergence on 
issues dealing with migration. In spite of 
the global financial and economic crisis 
that is reshaping the architecture of 
international migration, countries need 
migrants as contributors to develop-
ment. Migration could and should be a 
win-win-win game – though admittedly, 
some lose; some gain. What is needed 
is a comprehensive perspective and 
policy coherence for the orderly and 
humane management of migration so 
that globalisation wears a human face 
(Stiglitz, 2006).
Migration matters should no longer 
be handled bilaterally; a regional, or 
even global, approach that harmonises 
migration policies is required. There is 
also a need for dialogue and consulta-
tion among the various stakeholders, to 
discuss common approaches to their 
migration concerns and interests, to 
share ideas and to enhance understand-
ing and cooperation in migration man-
agement. Such a process could lead to 
the development of a coherent 
national, intra-regional, inter-regional 
and international policy framework for 
the management of migration. Indeed, 
migration and development policies 
might have a better chance of succeed-
ing if both sides of the migratory 
space—circumstances in the country of 
origin and of that of destination—were 
taken into account (Van Dalen and 
Esveldt 2003). Indeed a critical ingredi-
ent in the formulation of a coherent 
migration-friendly policy is an under-
standing of the dynamics and underlying 
factors of migration both at the origin 
and at the destination.
Discourses on migration, especially 
from the receiving end, are full of anxi-
ety, misconceptions, myths and preju-
dices; and are also fed on xenophobia. 
In that context, the positive aspects of 
migrants as agents of development in 
source and destination countries should 
be made explicit. Dialogue and consul-
tations among the various stakeholders, 
to discuss common approaches to their 
migration concerns and interests, share 
ideas and enhance understanding and 
cooperation in migration management, 
could lead to the development of a 
coherent policy framework for the 
management of migration.
In order to provide planners, politi-
cians and policy makers with compre-
hensive data on migration dynamics, 
cross-country collaborative research—
using innovative approaches to capture 
emerging and changing configura-
tions—is required on a number of 
themes. Foremost among these, we 
need information on the interlinked fac-
tors that drive traditional and changing 
migratory flows—labour migration, 
brain drain/brain circulation—in vari-
ous contexts in the region. Of special 
policy concern is the independent 
migration of female professionals and its 
impact on gender roles, as well as on 
family, social and development policies. 
Since migration in sub-Saharan Africa is 
essentially intraregional, policy research 
must also address the causes of the 
region’s contagious conflicts. Peace and 
stability are prerequisites for invest-
ment, development and employment 
generation, and good governance can 
help curtail skills flight and the exiling of 
the intelligentsia. 
The lesson to be learnt from the 
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collapse of the WTO Doha trade nego-
tiations in 2006 is that political will must 
be mustered to open the markets of 
rich countries to exports from develop-
ing countries, and to remove tariffs on 
imports of labour-intensive, job-creat-
ing goods produced by poor countries, 
in order to enhance economic growth 
and generate employment. Unless eco-
nomic and other opportunities are cre-
ated in poor countries, pressures for 
international migration will intensify, fur-
ther stalling domestic development.
The outsourcing of the responsibil-
ity for policing of borders, and of halting 
irregular migrants from the EU to the 
Maghreb countries is both unrealistic 
and unsustainable for lack of the finan-
cial and logistical facilities essential in 
carrying out the defence of their bor-
ders against the surge of irregular immi-
grants from other parts of Africa, and 
beyond. The recognition that strict con-
trol does not produce the desired 
results – instead it inadvertently spurs 
trafficking – the EU countries have pro-
posed investing in job creation, eco-
nomic growth and poverty alleviation 
schemes in Africa, in order to stem the 
tide of irregular emigration. This strat-
egy also includes some form of guest 
worker scheme and circulatory migra-
tion that allows Africans to work in 
specified sectors of labour shortage in 
EU countries, in regular situations. Mali 
is serving as a pilot for the new strategy.
African countries need to ensure 
that their specific interests and con-
cerns are adequately reflected in any 
bilateral and multilateral migration 
negotiations. Issues relating to the 
treatment of their nationals living and 
working in regular situations in EU 
countries, the rights of irregular 
migrants to basic services, and the need 
to review the unfair trade regimes 
which impoverish millions of their 
nationals who are engaged in farming at 
home should assume centre stage in 
future migration agreements. Efforts 
should be made to revisit existing 
agreements in order to review and 
amend unfavourable conditions. Bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements 
between countries sending and receiv-
ing migrants must also address the issue 
of depleting sub-Saharan Africa of its 
scarce skilled-manpower resources. It 
is important that residential laws of rich 
countries be made flexible, to give 
skilled professionals the opportunity of 
relocating without losing their resi-
dence rights in those countries (Ade-
poju et al., 2007).
The future of migration 
dynamics: A shared 
responsibility
African countries are facing daunting 
challenges in respect of most migratory 
configurations. Poverty eradication 
strategies should therefore be at the 
forefront of development assistance, 
aligned with domestic mechanisms for 
stable macro-economic environments 
favourable to growth, to generate 
employment opportunities and foster 
enterprise and self-sustaining liveli-
hoods. Efforts by poor African countries 
to restructure their economies and open 
their markets to share in the global econ-
omy have been disappointing. Thus far, 
emphasis on economic and political 
aspects and policies has ignored the 
crucial demographic dimension – that 
rapid population growth intensifies pov-
erty and emigration pressure.
Rich countries have a moral respon-
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sibility to assist programmes for the 
orderly return and reintegration of 
migrants to their countries of origin, 
especially highly-skilled professionals 
whose expertise is being productively 
utilised in these rich countries. Any 
long-term solution should emphasise 
economic growth and employment 
generation, the promotion of human 
rights, and security and related policy 
measures – as well as the factors that 
generate emigration from poor coun-
tries in the first place. 
In a spirit of co-responsibility, rich 
countries have to help poor African 
countries foster local development, 
reduce poverty and create domestic 
employment. Compensation for the 
brain drain could take the form of sup-
porting projects which involve profes-
sionals going back to their countries of 
origin for short periods, to work in spe-
cial programmes and education (ILO, 
2004). Ethical recruitment of highly-
skilled professionals must be enforced, 
and bilateral agreements promoted to 
minimise the adverse consequences on 
the development of source countries. 
Such bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments between developed and SSA 
countries should also address issues of 
haemorrhaging of its scarce skilled man-
power resources. It is important that 
residential rules in rich countries be 
made flexible to enable skilled profes-
sionals the opportunity for virtual relo-
cation without losing their residence 
rights. 
It seems apparent that success of 
restrictive migration policies depends on 
improving the economic situation in the 
immigrants’ countries of origin. Such a 
strategy also has the potential to stimu-
late the return of skilled nationals – 
needed for development in their own 
countries. This calls for cooperation 
between the poor sub-Saharan African 
labour-exporting countries and those of 
the North, beyond the rhetoric of co-
development. Unless economic and 
other opportunities are created in these 
countries, pressures for international 
migration will intensify. And in spite of 
the sharp economic and demographic 
divide between rich and poor coun-
tries, international migration can, with 
determination, political will, the right 
policies and recognition of the potential 
positive contribution of migration to 
development, indeed be a win-win-win 
situation to countries and societies that 
send and receive migrants and indeed 
the migrants themselves. 
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